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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN COMPANY,
a corporation,
PlaintiffAppellant,
Case No. 16610
vs.
BETTY J. BLACK, et al.,
DefendantsRespondent.

On Appeal from the District Court
for the Third Judicial District
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah
Honorable Christine M. Durham, District Judge
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff-appellant Utah
Mortgage Loan Company ("Utah Mortgage") to recover Thirtyeight Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-six Dollars and Fortythree Cents ($38,476.43)

(R. 4) or Thirty-six Thousand Seven

Hundred Sixty Dollars and One Cent ($36,760.01)

(R. 26 and

Appellant's Brief, p. 3) principal--plaintiff's version of
the correct amount has varied from time to time with the
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former amount claimed in its Complaint and the latter in its
Brief--plus interest thereon from defendants-respondent.
Plaintiff claims that the above sum represents the unpaid
principal balance on a Six Hundred Seventy-five Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifteen Dollar ($675,715.00) loan, secured by a
real estate trust deed, which it made to Betty J. (Mrs. Don
J.) Black, the late Don J. Black and Don J. Black Realty,
Inc.
1975.

(hereinafter collectively "the Blacks") on June 26,
R. 2.

The Blacks denied that any portion of the loan

remained unpaid and further contended that plaintiff's claim
was barred in any event by the One-Action Rule.

R. 9-11.

Summary judgment has been entered in defendants' favor (R.
68-69) and plaintiff appeals.
1.

The Subject Transaction.

It is undisputed

that plaintiff did lend $675,715.00 to the Blacks, on a deed
of trust note, on or about June 26, 1975 1 for a term of
eighteen months at interest of ten percent (10%) or two
percent (2%) above First Security Bank of Utah's prime
1

Appellant's suggestion that Mr. and Mrs. Black
were sureties, rather than principals (App. Br., pp. 17-20)
is an assertion which plaintiff devised for the first time
on appeal without any foundation in the record. Mr. and
Mrs. Black appear on the note as borrowers and principals,
not as sureties or guarantors. R. 4. Indeed, the Complaint
describes them as principals (claiming that Mr. and Mrs.
Black "made executed and delivered to plaintiff their Deed
of Trust Note." R. 2) and nowhere refers to them as anything
but borrowers. The characterization of them as guarantors
is an entirely novel notion which surfaced for the first
time in Utah Mortgage's brief on appeal.
2
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rate, the rate to be adjusted month to month.

R. 4.

It

further is undisputed that the loan was secured by a real
estate trust deed, with power of sale and assignment of costs
(R. 16-17), which was in the nature of a mortgage.

The deed

conveyed to McGhie Land Title Company, Utah Mortgage's trustee,
land which had an appraised value of Eight Hundred Ninetyfour Thousand Dollars ($894,000.00).

R. 25.

Plaintiff claims that $38,476.43 or $36,760.01 of
the $675,715.00 principal has not been paid (R. 3); the
Blacks claim that the loan was paid in full.

R. 10. 2

How-

ever, the other details of the Utah Mortgage-Black transactions
are clear and not in dispute:

The mortgaged property had

been purchased for subdividing.

A subdivision in fact was

created and the land was sold on a lot-by-lot basis.

The

trust deed provided that, at Utah Mortgage's sole election,
the property could be released piecemeal, upon payment of a
2

Appellant's statement at page 3 of its Brief that
"[a]ccording to the uncontradicted affidavit of Craig D.
Anderson, one of Utah Mortgage's loan officers, the unpaid
balance of the loan is $36, 760. 01 (R. 25 (§2))" is misleading.
That allegation is denied by the Answer. R. 10. Further,
the claim would have been denied by affidavit, had Mr.
Anderson's affidavit been served early enough for a response.
(The affidavit was received by defendants' counsel very
shortly before the hearing on the pending Motion for Summary
Judgment.) Defendant did file an affidavit of counsel,
pursuant to the terms of UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(f), stating that
Mrs. Black, the only person who could prepare an affidavit
on personal knowledge, was unavailable to respond to the
Anderson affidavit on such short notice. R. 52.
3
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suitable share of the loan. 3

R. 17; App. Br., p. 6.

It

appears from the record that Utah Mortgage was free to set
any release price it chose.

(In fact, Utah Mortgage

exercis~

that discretion by varying the release price to maintain
what it considered a satisfactory cash flow.

R. 26.)

The

trustee, on Utah Mortgage's instructions, released lots to
the Blacks' purchasers, retaining Five Thousand Two Hundred
Dollars ($5,200.00) to Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($5,500.00) of the purchase price from each sale.

Ibid.

By

Utah Mortgage's calculations, a per-lot release price of
$5,200.00 represented 115% of each lot's pro rata share of the
loan amount.

Ibid.

In other words, the number of lots in

the mortgaged property times $5,200.00 would have exceeded
the loan amount by 15%; the $5,500.00 release price was even
more favorable to plaintiff.

Because the property's appraised

value of $894,000.00--even before improvement and subdivision
increased its value--was 30% higher than the amount of the
loan (R. 25), Utah Mortgage could have withheld an even
higher release price, had it so desired.

In any event, the

trustee eventually released all the lots in the subdivision
on Utah Mortgage's instructions.

R. 19, 30.

3 The parties'
.
"agreement" to lot-by-lot release o f
the mortgaged property, of which appellant att;mpts to ma~e
much, consisted of the Blacks' agreement that [a]t any time
and from time to time upon written request of [Utah Mortgage]
••• , the Trustee [McGhie Land Title Company] may ..• reco~veY
••. all or part of the property." R. 17. The "agreement
gave Utah Mortgage complete discretion to release the land
on any basis it desired.
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4

There is no dispute as to the following material
facts:
1.

All releases of the mortgaged property were

made by the trustee at Utah Mortgage's request and withou~
fraud.

R. 43.
2.

Utah Mortgage did not foreclose upon the

collateral before corrunencing litigation against the Blacks on
the trust deed note.
3.

Ibid.

There has been no showing or indication that

the value of the mortgaged real estate was insufficient for
Utah Mortgage to have realized the property's full value
through foreclosure.

Indeed, the only evidence before the

Court concerning the property's value indicated--without
question by any party--that the property, even before
subdivision, which naturally would have increased its value,
was worth at least thirty percent (30%) more than the amount.
R.

25.
4.

Utah Mortgage's right to demand any payment it

chose as a condition of releasing lots was unrestricted.

17.

R.

It could and did vary the release price to suit its

perception of necessary cash flow.
5.

R. 26.

A release price of even $5,200 per lot would

have been more than sufficient to retire the loan, had Utah
Mortgage collected that price on each lot.

Ibid.

5
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6.

There is no allegation or evidence that Utah

Mortgage's failure to collect the full amount of the loan or,
alternatively, to retain the land was caused by any act of
the Blacks.
Respondents contend that there is no remaining
indebtedness on the note.

R. 10.

Utah Mortgage claims that

$38,467.43 (R. 3) or $36,760.01 (R. 26)--the amount varies,
depending upon which of plaintiff's papers one reads--of the
loan's $675,715 principal amount was unpaid.

Utah Mortgage

apparently claims that it somehow lost track of the loan
balance and released all the mortgaged lots before the loan
had been paid off.

If Utah Mortgage's claim is true, it

perpetrated a bizarre oversight, consisting essentially of
an inability to count.
Appellant has made no real attempt to justify its
conduct.

It simply asserts, at page 3 of its Brief:
Because of various cost overruns, delays
and unforeseen expenses, the amount
required to complete the project, and
the corresponding funds disbursed from
the loan amount[,] exceeded the fair
market value of the lots comprising
the project.
(R. 26 n17).)

This statement simply does not make sense and appellant,
apparently perceiving its silliness, does not try to rationalize it.

Utah Mortgage had lent $675,715; i f it had required

payment of $5 ,200 against the loan as a condition of releasing

6
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each lot in the subdivision, one of two events would have
occurred:

the loan would have been paid off in full long

before the last lot was released, or the lots would not have
been released and appellant could have foreclosed upon tnem.
Only two conclusions logically can be drawn from Utah Mortgage's
conduct:

either the loan in fact has been paid off and Utah

Mortgage has filed an unfounded lawsuit or some Utah Mortgage
employee has perpetrated an act of extreme negligence and
oversight which the company seeks to expiate by this action.
2.

The Parties' Positions.

The Blacks answered

the Complaint, denying that there was any unpaid balance on
Utah Mortgage's note.

R. 9-11.

Shortly afterward, they

moved for summary judgment, on the ground that plaintiff's
action was barred by the "One-Action Rule" (UTAH CODE ANN.
§78-31-1 (1976 Repl. Vol.)) and plaintiff's reconveyance of
the encumbered property.

R. 14-15.

Defendant resisted the

Motion and filed a purported Motion for Summary Judgment of
its own.

That Motion, however, sought judgment only as to

the Blacks' Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Defenses, not
judgment upon plaintiff's claim.

R. 20.

The Blacks resisted

plaintiff's Motion on various grounds, including that it was
untimely, having been served less than ten days before the
date set for hearing (in violation of UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c)),
that its supporting affidavits did not conform to the requirements
7
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of UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e), and that it did not seek judgment
upon any claim of the Complaint.

R. 49.

The tardiness of

plaintiff's Motion made a more substantive response impractical,
The Motions came before the Court on the parties'
papers, affidavits and oral argument on June 29, 1979.
Prior to the hearing, defendants pointed out, by their
papers, that the affidavit of Craig D. Anderson (which, by
the way, is the only evidence appellant has cited in its
Brief) was nearly entirely inadmissible under the terms of
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e).

R. 49.

However, Utah Mortgage gave

no indication of a need or desire for additional evidence;
it apparently had told its side of the story as well as it
could or, at least, as well as it wanted to.
The Blacks' position, both in this Court and below,
is that the One-Action Rule precludes any action to recover
a debt secured by a real estate mortgage other than through
foreclosure and deficiency proceedings, unless the security
has been lost or destroyed without the act or neglect of the
mortgagee.

In this case, the security obviously was lost

through the act and neglect of Utah Mortgage.
opposition to the judgment is threefold:

Utah Mortgage's

that the Blacks

somehow agreed to appellant's absent-minded releases of the
collateral (App. Br., pp. 5-10); that Utah Mortgage's "recove!J
on the promissory note could only be barred if it were
8
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negligent in releasing the collateral" (App. Br., p. 5); and
that Mr. and Mrs. Black, as alleged sureties, are not entitled
to the protection of the One-Action Rule.

App. Br., pp. 17-20.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD
THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WAS BARRED
FROM PROCEEDING AGAINST DEFENDANT
BY REASON OF THE ONE-ACTION RULE.
1.

Utah Mortgage is barred from proceeding
personally against the Blacks by its
failure to foreclose on the secured
property.

Section 78-37-1 (1976 Repl. Vol.), Utah Code
Annotated, provides, in pertinent part:
There can be one action for the
recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by
mortgage upon real estate which
action must be in accordance with
the provisions of this chapter • . . •
It repeatedly has been held that the remedy provided by
Section 78-37-1, its identical predecessor statutes and
analagous statutes of other states is exclusive and that a
debt secured by a real estate mortgage may be enforced only
through foreclosure followed by a deficiency judgment;
9
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direct actions against borrowers are prohibited.

Stewart

Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 105 Utah 529, 144 P.2d 276, 281-283
(1943).

Accord, United Growth Corp. v. Kelly, 86 Mich. App.

82, 272 N.W.2d 340, 343 (1978)

(" [M]ortgage foreclosure

proceedings are strictly statutory and courts are bound by
statutory provisions."

"Mortgage foreclosure proceedings

are special and statutory, and not an exercise of inherent
equity power of the Court. ") ; Bi sno v. Sax, 175 Cal. App. 2d
714, 345 P.2d 814, 819 (1959).

The "One-Action Rule" applies

to enforcement of trust deeds as well as mortgages--an
unsurprising result, since both instruments are identical as
a practical matter.

E.g., Bank of Italy v. Bentley, 217

Cal. 644, 658, 20 P.2d 940, 945 (1937); Walker v. Community

Bank.

111 Cal. Rptr. 897, 518 P.2d 329, 331 (1974); Bisno v. Sax,
supra, 346 P.2d at 819.

Cf., Mallory v. Kessler, 18 Utah

11, 14, 54 Pac. 892 (1898).
The Rule requires a mortgagee seeking to recover a
debt secured by real estate first to foreclose on the mortgaged
property; only in the event of a deficiency may it proceed
against the mortgagor personally. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-37-1,
2 (1976 Repl. Vol.).

It is well established, under Utah

law, that "the personal liability of the mortgagor cannot be
enforced until the [mortgaged] security has been exhausted."
National Bank of Commerce v. James Pingree Co., 62 Utah 259,
10
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218 Pac. 552

(1923), cited in Cache Valley Banking co. v.

LOgan Lodge, etc., 88 Utah 577, 56 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1936).
A mortgagee's failure to avail himself of the statutory
remedy will bar any other remedy.

Donaldson v. Grant, 15

Utah 231, 240-241, 49 Pac. 779 (1897).

The only recognized

exception to the Rule is "where the security has been lost
through no fault of the mortgagee" and foreclosure obviously
would be idle and fruitless procedure.

Cache Valley Bank of

Commerce v. Logan Lodge, supra, 56 P.2d at 1049.

(In Cache

Valley Bank of Commerce, plaintiff was a second mortgagee;
the first mortgagee already had foreclosed upon the land and
the profits from the foreclosure "were not sufficient to
satisfy [even] the first mortgage."
value unquestionably was nil.

The land's remaining

Id., 56 P.2d at 1049.)

That

exception is available only upon proof that the security,
through circumstances beyond the mortgagee's control became
completely valueless.

Security First Nat'l Bank v. Chapman,

31 Cal. App. 2d 182, 87 P.2d 724, 726-727 (1929); Cache
Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge, supra, 56 P.2d at 1049.

("It was no fault of the plaintiff's that the security for
its note was lost.

The fault is rather with the defendant

for failing to pay the first mortgage and thus causing it to
be foreclosed.

The plaintiff could not have prevented the

loss of its security . . . • " (emphasis added.));

Bailey v. Hansen,
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105 Mont. 552, 74 P.2d 438, 440 (1937)

(A mortgagee is

excused from foreclosure only if "the security has become
valueless through no act of his.").
The Rule's purpose is to create a regularity and
predictability in real estate financing.
§334, at 700-702

(2d ed. 1970).

OSBORNE, MORTGAGES

As the Utah Bankers Association,

amicus curiae herein, states, the Rule should be applied "to
avoid frustrating the reasonable expectations of lenders and
borrowers."

Amicus Br., p. 1.

The Blacks were ,entitled to

rely upon Utah Mortgage's competence and care in maintaining
its collateral after they had deeded their real estate to
its trustee.

The record reveals no evidence--much less

proof--of the property's destruction or valuelessness in
this case.

Indeed, plaintiff concedes that, even before im-

provement, that the mortgaged property had an appraised
value, as relatively raw land, of $894,000 (R. 25)--enough
to satisfy a $675,715 principal amount, with nearly $220,000
left over for interest.
If Utah Mortgage lost the security for its loan
before that loan was paid off, it did so through a voluntary
reconveyance of the property, not through destruction or
prior foreclosure.

At best, Utah Mortgage can claim only

that its security was lost through its neglect and inadvertence.

Such a loss cannot excuse a mortgagee from the
12
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one-Action Rule's requirements, as Utah Mortgage admits.
("Utah Mortgage's ... recovery on the promissory note could
only be barred if it were negligent in releasing the collateral."

App. Br., p.5).

This Court held in Donaldson

v. Grant, supra, 240-241, that a mortgagee who lost his
1
•

security through a failure to make a timely recording was
barred from proceeding personally against the mortgagor.
The plaintiff having lost his right
to foreclose his mortgage on the
property by his neglect to have its
assignment to him recorded, the
further question arises, can he
maintain his action against Grant,
the maker of the note, and the
mortgage to secure it?
[T]hese can be but one action for
the recovery of a debt or the
enforcement of any right secured
by mortgage upon real estate or
personal property; that the court
may direct a sale of the incumbered property •.. and apply
the proceeds to the payment of
costs and the amount due the
plaintiff, and, if it appears ...
that the proceeds are insufficient, a judgment may be
docketed for the balance against
the defendant personally liable
for the debt . . . . This section
requires the property mortgaged
to be subjected first to the
payment of the debt, and the
mortgagee or any assignee of the
note cannot recover a personal
judgment unless the proceeds of
the sale of the property mortgaged prove to be insufficient.

13
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The Court added:
"~t may be that if the mortgagor's
title to the land has become extinguished subsequent to the
making of the mortgage, by title
paramount, or if the mortgaged
property has been destroyed or
ceased to exist, the mortgagee
need not go through the idle form
of bringing an action for the
foreclosure before he can have a
judgment on the note. But, when
the mortgagee by his own act--or-neglect deprives himself of the
right to foreclose the mortgage,
he at the same time deprives
himself of the right to an action
on the note • . . . " [citation omitted.]

Id, 15 Utah at 241.

Accord, Hibernia Sav. and Loan Co. v.

Thornton, 109 Cal. 427, 42 Pac. 447, 448 (1895)

(holding

that mortgagee's failure to present a claim in probate
similarly barred him from personal action) .

Appellant does

not dispute that its claim would be barred if the security
for the Blacks' loan had been lost through its neglect:

(In

fact, Donaldson states that the mortgagee forfeits its
rights if the property is lost through its act or neglect.
Appellant does not--and cannot--dispute that, had
it kept proper track of the lots which it was releasing, the
Blacks' indebtedness would have been satisfied from the
collateral.
The question before the Court then is whether Utah
Mortgage's alleged premature release of the collateral
14
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constituted an "act or neglect" by it.
that it does.

It appears clear

The parameters of the applicable Utah law are

defined by the Donaldson and Cache Valley Banking Company
cases, supra.

Failure to record a mortgage was an "act er

neglect" sufficient to defeat a mortgagee's right to proceed
personally in Donaldson; by contrast, loss of the property
through paramount title of a prior mortgagee (which the second
mortgagee obviously could not have prevented) was not sufficient
to defeat those rights in Cache Valley Banking.
Utah Mortgage's failure to keep track of its
property clearly is equivalent to (if not even more extreme)
than the mortgagee's conduct in Donaldson.

The type of loss

which will not defeat a mortgagee's right to recovery is
described by McMillan v. United Mortgage Co., 82 Nev. 117,
412 P.2d 604, 606 (1966):
[I]f the security, without fault of
the mortgagee or beneficiary, has
become valueless as where the
security has been destroyed by fire
and other similar situations.
(Emphasis added.)

More pointedly, this Court ruled in Cache

Valley Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge, supra, 56 P.2d at 1949, that
the test is whether the mortgagee "could not have prevented the
loss of its security."

Obviously, Utah Mortgage, through its

trustee, could have prevented the loss.
Utah Mortgage attempts to exonerate itself from
15
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the consequences of its acts by raising something analagous ~
a claim of contributory negligence:
negligent, so were the Blacks.
wash.

that even though it was

That claim simply will not

First, there is no evidence whatever that the Blacks

were aware that Utah Mortgage had lost track of its collateral.
Second, the law is specific that the test is whether the
property was lost through the "act or neglect" of the mortgagee
(in the words of Donaldson) or when the mortgagee "could not
have prevented the loss"

(in the words of Cache Valley Banking).

The law imposes a burden of proper performance
upon the mortgagee.

If it fails in its responsibility, it

cannot be exonerated by the conduct of some other party.
Indeed, the rule which Utah Mortgage proposes--without any
support in the case law--would be grossly unfair.

As beneficiar

of the trust deed, appellant, a large, sophisticated banking
institution, was uniquely capable of keeping track of its
collateral.

As the court noted in Girard Trust Bank v. O'Neill,

219 Pa. Super. 363, 281 A.2d 670, 671 (1971), once a bank
takes control of collateral, as Utah Mortgage had, the borrower
has no way of ensuring that the collateral will be protected
in a careful manner.

By contrast, Utah Mortgage had ample

means of ensuring the collateral's integrity.

The proper

rule is clear from a comparison of the cases which have
disallowed a mortgagee to sue personally (e.g., Donaldson
16
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and Hibernia Sav. and Loan Co, supra) with those which have
allowed it to do so (e.g., Cache Valley Banking, supra,
First Nat'l Bank, Giddings v. Helwig, 464 S.W.2d 953, 954
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971)
a fire)):

(involving loss of collateral thro~gh

the mortgagee is relieved from its duty to proceed

by foreclosure only if the property is lost through circum-

stances beyond its control (i.e., where it "could not have
prevented the loss," in the words of the Cache Valley Banking
decusion).

In the instant case, the mortgaged property's

release admittedly was completely within Utah Mortgage's
control.
Utah Mortgage held the Blacks' property as security
on a loan which became due on January 1, 1977.

More than

two years after the due date--after allowing its borrowers
to dispose of whatever proceeds they had received from sale
of the secured property in the reasonable belief that Utah
Mortgage had drawn funds necessary to repay the loan--the
company discovered its error (assuming that there actually
was a balance due) and sued the Blacks for funds which
should have been accounted for long ago.

Utah Mortgage had

perpetrated the very kind of mismanagement which the Rule
penalizes.

17
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2.

Utah Mortgage cannot excuse its
apparent loss of collateral by
reason of the Blacks' alleged
agreement to its release.

There is no evidence in the record that the Blacks
agreed to any release of collateral beyond the provision of
the trust deed cited at page 6 of Appellant's Brief (Note
and at 3, supra), which authorized Utah Mortgage to release
lots at its sole discretion.

Certainly, such a provision

carries with it at least an implied agreement by Utah Mortgage
to dispose of the collateral in a careful and prudent manner.
Utah Mortgage in effect is urging that a waiver of plaintiff's
rights under the One-Action Rule has occurred.

However, the

record reveals no basis for finding a waiver.
The standard for finding of waiver is explicit.
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To
constitute a waiver, there must be
an existing right, benefit, or
advantage, or knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to
relinquish it.
It must be
distinctly made . • . .
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308,
311-312 (1936).

The only agreement between Utah Mortgage

and the Blacks for the release of lots was the trust deed,
which gave Utah Mortgage discretion to release the lots as
18
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it chose.

That agreement certainly neither contains nor

implies a consent to prematurely surrender the collateral.
Indeed, had Utah Mortgage implemented what it claims to have
been its release program--of retaining $5,200.00 or $5,500.00

4
per lot --the loan would have been discharged with funds to
spare.

Appellant, if its allegations are to be believed, simply

did not keep track of its property.

There is not a shred of

evidence that this sloppiness was agreed to by the Blacks.
The trust deed was executed against a background
of longstanding real estate financing practices:
A construction loan is the usual
source of funds with which the
builder will finance the improvements he will build on the lanq.
In essence, the construction loan
is a short-term loan, usually
secured by a first mortgage or
deed of trust on the property,
which will be paid off in full as
to each lot when the lot is ultimately sold to a home buyer.

4 rn fact, there is no competent evidence that the
Blacks agreed to Utah Mortgage's specific release program.
The only reference to such an agreement occurring ~n the
record below is the Anderson affidavit (R. 26), which asserts:
At the time it made the loan Utah
Mortgage agreed with the Blacks and
Black Realty that it would give a
partial release to individual lots
in the proposed subdivision upon
payment of $5,200.00 per lot. :··
The release price was later raised
to $5,500.00.
19
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NELSON & WHITMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REAL ESTATE FINANCE
AND DEVELOPMENT, 553

p.2).

(1976)

(cited at Amicus Curiae's Brief,

To suggest that the Blacks agreed to,a waste of the

collateral when they agreed to a practice which routinely is
implemented to pay off is utterly untenable speculation.

It

does not amount to a genuine issue of fact which could defeat
summary judgment.

Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1094 (5th

Cir. 1975); reh. denied, 521 F.2d 814 (1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 940 (1976); Fireman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug, 149
F.2d 359, 362 (5th Cir. 1945).
The cases of consent to a discharge of security
which appellant has cited (Mono Irr. Co. v. State, 32 Cal. 194,
162 P.2d 647 (1916); Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v. Jones, 49
Utah 519, 164 Pac. 1029 (1917)) involved clear consents to
specific sales.

They are not analogous to the instant case.

Even if the Blacks had made an agreement by signing
the trust deed, which was simultaneous with the loan (R. 2, 16)
which waived the One-Action Rule, such an agreement would be
void.

As was held in Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal. 2d 263, 138

P.2d 7, 9 (1943):
Since necessity often drives debtors
to make serious concessions when a
loan is needed, [the One-Action Rule)
should be applied to protect them and
to prevent a waiver in advance.

The affidavit contains no claim of personal knowledge or
.
affirmative showing that Mr. Anderson was competent to testifY
on the subject of the release.
It is inadmissible under UTAH
R. CIV. P. 56(e).
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There is no Utah case on the point decided by Salter.

The

California rule is sound and should be applied.
II.

MR. AND MRS. BLACK WERE NOT SURETIES
AND, EVEN IF THEY WERE SURETIES,
UTAH MORTGAGE'S FAILURE TO FORECLOSE WOULD BAR A CLAIM AGAINST THEM.
Utah Mortgage as argued that Mr. and Mrs. Black
signed their note of June 26, 1975 as sureties rather than
principals.

The note upon which plaintiff sues represents Mr.

and Mrs. Black to be principals, not sureties.

It is uni-

versally recognized that "[i]f a note is signed by two or more
makes, it will be presumed that they are co-makers and liable
as such, and not as principal and surety."

In re Chamberlain's

Estate, 44 Cal. App. 2d 193, 112 P.2d 53, 57 (1941).

Accord,

Morris' Estate v. Kirby's Estate, 192 Okl. 69, 133 P.2d 896
(1945).

There is no evidence in the record which could

overcome that presumption.
Plaintiff seeks to defeat a summary judgment on the
basis as "issue" of fact which is sheer speculation.

Such an

"issue" may not enter into a summary judgment proceeding.
Tyler v. Vickery, supra; Fireman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug,
supra.
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Even if Mr. and Mrs. Black were sureties, Utah
Mortgage's release of the collateral would discharge them as
well as Black Realty.

There is indeed authority--although

it apparently exists only in Nevada (First Nat'l Bank of
Nevada v. Barengo, 91 Nev. 396, 536 P.2d 487 (1975); ~
v. Heers, 366 F. Supp. 851 (D. Nev. 1973))--that a mortgagee
may proceed directly against a surety, leaving the surety to
recover against the mortgagor, when the security has not
been compromised.

However, it is universally held that,

under no circumstances may a mortgagee who has allowed the
collateral to be wasted recover against the surety.

A

creditor has a duty to a surety to preserve the collateral
against which the surety may recover if he is required to
discharge his principal's obligation.

Should the creditor

compromise that collateral, or discharge the principal debt,
the surety is discharged to the extent of the loss.

E.g.,

Inland-Ryerson Const. Co. v. Brazier Const. Co., 7 Wash. App.
338, 500 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1972); Breckenridge v. Mason, 64
Cal. Rptr. 201, 207, 256 Cal. App. 2d 121 (1967).

The

Restatement provides:
Where the creditor has security from the
principal and knows of the s~ret~'s
obligation, the surety's obligation is
reduced pro tanto if the creditor
(a)
surrenders or releases the
security, or
{b) wilfully or negligently harms
it, or
(c)
fails to take reasonable action
to preserve its value at a time
when the surety does not have an
opportunity to take such action.
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RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (1941)

I

§132.

The rule Of the Re-

statement appears to have been followed in every reported
decision which involves a compromise of collateral by the
principal creditor.

E. g., O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank,

296 N. C. 212, 250 S.E.2d 587, 598 (1978); Girard Trust
Bank v. O'Neill, 219 Pa. Super. 363, 281 A.2d 670, 671
(1971)

(holding that once a bank took control of collateral,

it must sustain the loss if the collateral was collected in
a negligent manner); First Nat'l Bank v. Haugen Ford, Inc.,
219 N.W.2d 847, 852 (N. D. 1974); Chicago Bridge and Iron Co.
v. Reliance Ins. Co., 46 Ill.2d 522, 264 N.E.2d 134, 136
(1970); Walin v. Young, 181 Ore. 185, 180 P.2d 535, 537 (1947).
Appellant has offered no reason why the Restatement
and the rule of numerous jurisdictions should not be followed.
If Mr. and Mrs. Black were sureties, they should have the same
rights as all other sureties.
Finally, appellant's claim of suretyship, not having
been raised below, is improperly before this Court and should
be disallowed.

Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltini Research,

176 F.2d 799, 809 (1st Cir. 1949).
III.

PLAINTIFF'S "MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT" PROPERLY WAS DENIED.
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.,
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, as the
record reveals, was untimely filed.

Defendant did not have

time to respond to it on the merits and the Motion should
have been disregarded in any event.

Further, the Motion was

improper in that it attempted only to defeat certain affirmative defenses and did not seek judgment on a claim of the
Complaint.

The Complaint herein consists of a single claim:

to recover an alleged debt.

It is well established that a

motion for summary judgment may not seek less than judgment on
at least one claim of a complaint.

It may not be used as a

device for attacking specific defenses or components of a
single claim.

Marino v. Nevitt, 311 F.2d 406, 408 (3d Cir.

1962); United States v. Burnett, 262 F.2d 55, 58-59 (9th Cir.
1958)

(disallowing a motion for summary judgment addressed to

certain items of damages only); Biggins v. Oltmer Iron Works,
Inc., 154 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1946).

Finally, the Craig

Anderson affidavit (R. 25-26), which is the sole evidentiary
support of the Motion, is inadmissible, as has been discussed
above.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was improper!)
taken and was properly denied.
CONCLUSION
This is not the far-reaching matter which plaintiff
24
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and the amicus curiae have characterized it as being.

This

is a case of a large lending institution, through almost
unbelievable incompetence, forfeiting collateral.

It seeks

now, in disregard of well established rules of law, to make
its debtors pick up the tab for its failure.

No material

fact concerning the subject transaction is in dispute.
summary judgment properly was entered below and should be
affirmed by this Court.
DATED this

/f/l

day of January, 1980.
L. S. McCULLOUGH, JR.
RICARDO B. FERRARI
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake Cit~, Utah 84111
Attorneys fo7"Defend'n· ~yRespondent ,/ ·'/

BYµ~~
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